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Will Motive, Opportunity or Recklessness
No Longer Constitute Scienter for Fraud?
A Survey of Recent Federal District
Court Decisions After the Enactment of
the 1995 Private Securities Litigation
,Reform Act
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (Reform Act), recent federal district court decisions are causing an uproar
in the area of securities fraud litigation. The Reform Act was passed on December
22, 1995, when Congress overrode President Clinton's veto.' The Reform Act
imposes significant new limitations and requirements on private securities fraud
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. See Bruce G. Vanyo et al., The Pleading Standard of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1015, at 74 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. B4-7199, 1997). The following explanation accompanied President Clinton's veto:
I am prepared to support the high pleading standard of the [Second Circuit]-the highest
pleading standard of any Federal circuit court. But the conferees make crystal clear in the
Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard even beyond that level. I am not
prepared to accept that.
The conferees deleted an amendment offered by Senator Specter and adopted by the
Senate that specifically incorporated Second Circuit case law with respect to pleading a claim
of fraud. Then they specifically indicated that they were not adopting Second Circuit case law
but instead intended to "strengthen" the existing pleading requirements of the Second Circuit.
All this shows that the conferees meant to erect a higher barrier to bringing suit than any now
existing ....
Id. (quoting PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WILLIAM CLINTON, VETO OF H.R. 1058, H.R. Doc.
No. 104-150, at 1 (1995)). See generally Martha L. Cochran et al., The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act-Overview, Summary and New Developments, in 28TH ANNUAL INSTITrrTE ON SECURITIES
LITIGATION 962, at 185-88 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7141, 1996)
(providing an overview describing the efforts and events which culminated in the enactment of the
Reform Act).
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actions brought under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). Specifically, the Reform Act calls into
question the scienter element that plaintiffs must meet in order to bring a private
action under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 4 and under the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) rule lOb-5.5 The Supreme Court defined scienter as
"a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."6
The Reform Act amends the Exchange Act by adding that "the complaint shall
state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed"7 and "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind."' These code provisions are applicable to all securities
fraud cases filed after the enactment of the Reform Act.9
3. See generally Cochran et al., supra note 2, at 189-92 (summarizing the Reform Act's major
provisions); John L. Latham & Jenna L. Fruechtenicht, Securities Regulation, 48 MERCERL. REV. 1677
(1997) (providing a broad overview of securities regulation).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for any person "[t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe." See Rehm v.
Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
6. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,193-94 n.12 (1976) (holding that in the absence
of activities involving scienter, an action under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5 will
not lie). See generally William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 34 Hous. L. REV. 121 (1997) (providing an overview of the history and
application of scienter).
7. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (1997)
(emphasis added). Section 78u-4(b)(1) states in pertinent part that "the complaint shall specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and,
if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint
shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed." Id. See generally William S.
Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893 (1996) (providing a historical and structural examination of §
21D(b)).
8. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 104 (emphasis added). In its entirety, section 78u-
4(b)(2) provides:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money
damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint
shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.
Id. See generally Elliot J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or
Road Block?, 38 ARI. L. REV. 675 (1996) (concluding that § 21D(b)(2) presents more of a speed bump
than a road block for plaintiffs pursuing open market fraud claims because the effectiveness of this
provision is dependant upon each court's own interpretation of the pleading standard).
9. See Cochran et al., supra note 2, at 192.
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The Reform Act was prompted by the need and goal of "curbing frivolous
securities class action litigation."'" In 1996, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt
explained in his own words why private securities litigation reform was desirable:
It doesn't help investors or the markets if we're too accommodating of those who
think that they should be able at the drop of a hat-or the drop of a stock-to file a
lawsuit immediately, hoping to wring out a profitable settlement, whether or not the
company or its officers did anything wrong.
... So it was unusual for an SEC Chairman to acknowledge that the litigation
system required reform. But the pendulum had swung too far toward plaintiffs, and
it needed to be brought into better balance."
Before the enactment of the Reform Act, "plaintiffs were permitted to aver
scienter generally."' 2 Now, with the adoption of the Reform Act, plaintiffs are
required to meet the "strong inference" standard to prove that defendants acted
with the required state of mind. 3 It is generally agreed that this strong inference
standard reflects the Second Circuit's interpretation of scienter for alleging
securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.'4 The Second Circuit
requires a plaintiff to "allege specific facts that either (1) 'constitut[e] circumstan-
tial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior,' or (2) 'establish a motive
to commit fraud and an opportunity to do so.""..5 However, when the Reform Act
10. See Securities Litigation Abuses: Concerning the Impact of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban
Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC), available in 1997 WL
11235194 [hereinafter Levitt].
11. Arthur Levitt, "Final Thoughts on Litigation Reform" Remarks by Chairman Arthur Levitt
United States Securities and Exchange Commission 23'd Annual Securities Regulation Institute San
Diego, California January 24, 1996, 33 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 835, 837-38 (1996).
12. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 754 (N.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter
Silicon Graphics 11].
13. See Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 43 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4(b)(2)).
14. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 736.
15. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Silicon Graphics 1] (quoting In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d
259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993)). "To allege conscious misbehavior or recklessness, the Complaint must link
the misleading statement with facts that give rise to an inference that the speaker had a basis for
knowing it was false." Shahzad v. H.J. Meyers & Co., No. 95 Civ. 6196 (DAB), 1997 WL 47817, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1997) (adopting both prongs of the Second Circuit's, standard) (citing Shields v.
Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1129 (2d Cir. 1994); Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., No. 90
Civ. 5788, 1995 WL 261518, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1995)). "Motive requires a showing of 'concrete
benefits that could be realized by one or more of the false statements ... 'alleged' and opportunity is
shown by 'the means and likely prospect of achieving concrete benefits by the means alleged."' Id.
was enacted, it could be argued that Congress did not whole-heartedly adopt the
Second Circuit's pleading standard because any language referring to motive,
opportunity, and recklessness was left out. 6
The distinct opinions reached by federal district courts reflect the ambiguity
of the Reform Act as the courts attempt to balance the Reform Act's legislative
history, language and purpose against established precedent. 7 Significant splits
have been observed among federal district courts interpreting key Reform Act
provisions as some courts have heightened the pleading standard needed to bring
a private securities fraud action and others have not. 8 According to congressional
testimony by SEC Chairman Levitt, the courts are divided over the proper
interpretation of the Reform Act's language because each court takes a distinct
view of the Reform Act's legislative history."' The most interesting aspect about
the decisions raising the standard for pleading private securities fraud is that the
law is well established in each of the ten federal appellate courts which have
considered this issue.2' For instance, in each federal circuit, the "proof of
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement and can establish liability under the
anti-fraud provision of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act."'" Some views of
recklessness include holding "plaintiffs to a higher standard of pleading and proof
by requiring the reckless conduct to be of such degree that it can serve as evidence
of knowing or intentional deception, manipulation or fraud."22 Other courts have
held that "pleading and proving unqualified reckless conduct will suffice."23
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the appropriate pleading standard for
fraud following the enactment of the Reform Act, and until the Supreme Court
does, it is likely that federal district courts will continue to apply the Reform Act
(quoting Shields, 25 F.3d at 1129; Pollack, 1995 WL 261518, at *2).
16. See Silicon Graphics 11, 970 F. Supp. at 756.
17. See generally Levitt, supra note 10, at *17 (stating that "the courts are divided over the proper
interpretation of this language").
18. See Securities Litigation Abuses: Ten Things We Know and Ten Things We Don't Know About
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (joint written testimony of Joseph A.
Grundfest and Michael A. Perino), available in 1997 WL 11235196 [hereinafter Ten Things We Know].
19. See Levitt, supra note 10. At least eight courts have adopted the traditional Second Circuit
standard allowing "plaintiffs to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendants acted
either knowingly or recklessly, or that the defendants had a motive and opportunity to commit the
fraud." See id. A more stringent standard has been adopted by at least five other courts, requiring that
"only conscious misrepresentations or omissions" or "deliberate recklessness" satisfy the Reform Act's
pleading standard. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. The Supreme Court found in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), that
a section 10(b) claim requires a showing of scienter which cannot be supported by negligence alone.
See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Scienter Requirement Under Securities Litigation Reform,
N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1997, at 5. Following Hochfelder, almost every court of appeals has determined that
some form of "recklessness" may satisfy the required state of mind requirement. See id.
22. See Block & Hoff, supra note 21, at 5.
23. Id.
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as they see fit.24 By analyzing recent federal district court decisions, this Cormnent
will focus on the justifications for the decisions made by federal district courts and
whether some federal district courts have gone too far in their interpretations of the
Reform Act by holding that motive, opportunity, or recklessness no longer
constitute scienter for fraud.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PLEADING STANDARD
A Congressional Conference Committee Report that accompanied the Reform
Act noted the seriousness of naming a party in a civil suit for fraud, which
represents the reason why rule 9(b) of.the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure25
requires plaintiffs to plead allegations of fraud with "particularity." '26 However, the
Committee observed that this pleading rule "has not prevented the abuse of the
securities laws by private litigants."'27 Additionally, the courts of appeals have
interpreted rule 9(b) in conflicting ways, resulting in the application of distinct and
differing standards.28 The Committee Report further commented that the House
and Senate hearings on securities litigation reform recognized these inconsistencies
and noted the need to establish "uniform and more stringent pleading requirements"
in order to curtail the filing of frivolous lawsuits.29 When choosing the language
of the Reform Act, the Conference Committee used the pleading standard of the
Second Circuit as a foundation because this standard specifically incorporated rule
24. In Miller v. Provenz, 102 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 48 (1997), the
Supreme Court had an opportunity to "resolve the perennial question of what constitutes scienter
sufficient to support liability under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act," but certiorari
was denied when the Supreme Court convened for the 1997-98 term. See US Supreme Court: Justices
Face Variety of Securities Issues as 1997-98 Term Convenes, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Sept. 29, 1997, at
D3. In Miller, stock purchasers brought a class action against a computer company and its officers for
securities fraud. See id. The Northern District Court of California granted the company's motion for
summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that a triable issue
as to scienter existed. See id. In their petition for review, the defendants "urged that
recklessness-especially objective recklessness, which approaches mere negligence-does not satisfy
the plain language of section 10(b). It is completely inconsistent with the statute's legislative history."
Id. The defendants contended that this case warranted Supreme Court review because lower courts were
"in disarray" as to what constitutes scienter for section 10(b) actions. See id. In their opposition brief,
plaintiffs stated that "[allthough the [Reform Act] changed the law governing pleading and proof of
scienter in securities cases... (it) does not govern this case." Id. (alterations in original). Miller was
denied certiorari review on October 6, 1997. See id.
25. FED. R. CWv. P. 9(b).
26. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 736.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
9(b)'s notion of pleading with particularity.3" The Second Circuit's standard is
regarded as the most stringent pleading standard because "the plaintiff must state
facts with particularity, and in turn, these facts must give rise to a 'strong inference'
of the defendant's fraudulent intent."'" The Committee stated that "[b]ecause the
Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does
not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading
standard."32 Additionally, the report stated that "[flor this reason, the Conference
Report chose not to include in the pleading standard certain language relating to
motive, opportunity, or recklessness."33 Furthermore, the Committee noted that the
plaintiffs must specifically plead with particularity each statement they allege to be
misleading, explain in detail the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading,
and if the plaintiffs base an allegation on information and belief, then they must
plead with particularity those facts in their possession that influenced their belief.34
Although the Reform Act's legislative history suggests Congress intended a
more exact pleading standard for scienter, the Reform Act does not define the
required state of mind or specify the standard by which to measure allegations of
scienter.3" Consequently, courts differ in their interpretations of "both the conduct
necessary to satisfy the scienter element of section 10(b) as well as the standard for
pleading fraud."36 As a result, there is some ambiguity as to whether the pleading
standard is more stringent than the Second Circuit's standard because the Reform
Act's language is so vague.37 This ambiguity results in "inconsistent judicial
application of the Reform Act."38
111. A SURVEY OF RECENT POST-REFORM ACT OPINIONS BY FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS
The federal district courts that have been most active in rendering post-Reform
Act decisions are the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits. 9 For the most part, the opinions interpreting the Reform Act
can be categorized into one of three approaches.' The first approach heightens the
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 44.
34. See id. at 36.
35. See Block & Hoff, supra note 21, at 5.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., William S. Lerach, "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-20 Months
Later," Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, "A
Brave New World," in SEcURrrIEs LITIGATION 1015, at 40-41 (PL Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B4-7199, 1997) (listing cases from various circuits that adopt the Second
Circuit's pleading standard).
40. See Block & Hoff, supra note 21, at 5.
384
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pleading standard for fraud by rejecting recklessness, which prior to the Reform
Act, had been an established and accepted standard for scienter.4 Instead,
plaintiffs are required "to plead and prove that the defendant acted with a deliberate
and conscious intent to commit fraud."42 The second approach essentially adopts
the standard of the Second Circuit by holding that reckless conduct can establish
substantive law scienter and that the pleading standard under the Reform Act is
satisfied by allegations of the "defendant's 'motive and opportunity' to commit
fraud."43 The third approach keeps the standard of the Second Circuit in place by
permitting a showing of recklessness to meet the Reform Act's scienter substantive
law requirement.' However, this approach asserts that allegations based solely on
the defendant's motive and opportunity to commit fraud do not satisfy the Reform
Act's heightened "strong inference" pleading standard which requires a showing
of conscious behavior.45
The SEC has stated that it will intervene in any decisions holding that
allegations of recklessness do not satisfy the pleading requirements for private
securities fraud because these decisions are contrary to "established case law
upholding recklessness as a basis for liability."46 To effectively enforce securities
laws, SEC Chairman Levitt has stated that the recklessness standard is "absolutely
fundamental" to the work of the SEC.47 Chairman Levitt further expressed that
"[i]f we were to lose the recklessness standard, in my judgment, we would leave
substantial numbers of the investing public naked to attack by fraudsters and
schemers."48
A. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit provides the most active forum for securities litigation.49
This Comment will first review federal district court decisions made in the Ninth
Circuit because these decisions have received the most attention from other
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See Levitt, supra note 10.
47. See Litigation Reform: Levitt Eschews 'Broad-Based Preemption ' ofPrivate Securities Actions
Under State Law, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Oct. 22, 1997, at D2.
48. Id.
49. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's
Experience, § VII (last modified July 23, 1997) <http://securities.stanford.edu/report/
pslrayrl/index.html>. The Ninth Circuit accounted for 27.6% of all securities law suits filed between
December 22, 1995 and December 31, 1996. See id.
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circuits, as well as the SEC. With respect to the pleading standard for securities
fraud, other circuits and interested parties frequently cite to decisions rendered by
the federal district courts within the Ninth Circuit. 50 Additionally, for the first time,
with respect to this issue, one particular Ninth Circuit decision prompted the SEC
to take a strong stance by filing an amicus curiae brief.5
Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp.2 was the first
Ninth Circuit federal district court case to deal with the issue of whether the
Reform Act heightens the pleading standard for securities fraud.53 In Marksman,
the court read the legislative history of the Reform Act and concluded that the
Reform Act did not eradicate the motive and opportunity test for establishing
scienter 4 The court confronted and addressed the controversial language in
footnote twenty-three of the Conference Committee Report.5 5 Footnote twenty-
three suggests that Congress chose not to codify the Second Circuit's standard
because it intended to strengthen the pleading requirement. 6 The Marksman court
recognized the implications of the language in footnote twenty-three; however, the
court noted that this language did not "indicate that Congress chose to specifically
disapprove the motive and opportunity test."57 The court further commented that
it had "little doubt that when Congress wishes to supplant ajudicially-created rule
it knows how to do so explicitly, and in the body of the statute.""8 As noted by one
commentator, the Marksman court found "the 'motive and opportunity' test to be
consistent with the Reform Act's purposes, relatively invulnerable to abuse, and to
represent a tested and proven rule that courts outside the Second Circuit could also
easily adopt."59
50. See Vanyo et al., supra note 2, at 91; see also CA Judge May Reconsider Pleading Standard
for Securities Fraud: In re Silicon Graphics Securities Litigation, ANDREWS SEC. & COMMODITIES
LITIG. REP., May 14, 1997.
51. See SEC Asks Judge to Take Another Look at Silicon Fraud Ruling: In re Silicon Graphics
Securities Litigation, ANDREWS SEC. & COMMODITIES LmI. REP., Feb. 12, 1997, at 8.
52. 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
53. See id. at 1310.
54. See id. at 1311-12. In a footnote, the Marksman court also refuted the defendants' argument
that the Reform Act abolished mere recklessness as a form of scienter. See id. at 1309 n.9. The court
believed that the Conference Committee Report accompanying the Reform Act suggested that Congress
did not intend to change the existing state of mind requirements, including recklessness. See id. The
court stated that unless the recklessness standard was specifically abrogated, it remained viable. See
id. The court acknowledged the ambivalent positions legislators took with respect to the recklessness
standard, resulting in Congress' reluctance to make a final, statutory determination as to whether
recklessness establishes scienter. See id. However, the court found that recklessness remained a viable
form of scienter despite the Reform Act's text and legislative history because "legislative silence" does
not allow a court to determine that recklessness no longer constitutes scienter. See id.
55. See id. at 1311.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See John C. Coffee, Jr., First Anniversary: PSLRA of 1995, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1997, at 5.
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Although Marksman was the first district court in the Ninth Circuit to address
the issue of whether the Reform Act heightens the pleading standard for securities
fraud, Marksman has not been followed in all Ninth Circuit decisions.' The two
Silicon Graphics cases, which were decided after Marksman, address the "same
question in precisely the reverse light."61 The divergent views expressed amongst
these cases within the same circuit illustrate the "inherent ambiguity of the
legislative record" as clear answers for interpreting the strong inference standard
implemented under the Reform Act.62
The two Silicon Graphics cases are particularly noteworthy Ninth Circuit
decisions that raise the pleading standard for private securities fraud, ultimately
finding that "motive, opportunity, and non-deliberate recklessness" are, in and of
themselves, insufficient to support a finding of scienter unless the totality of the
circumstances creates a strong inference of fraud.63 The opinion in Silicon
Graphics H builds on the opinion stated in Silicon Graphics 1.64 In deciding each
case, Judge Smith paid close attention to the Reform Act's language, legislative
history, and policy goals of discouraging frivolous securities fraud litigation.65
Those opposing the Silicon Graphics' holdings question the right of a federal
district court to redefine scienter as conscious knowledge when almost every other
60. But see In re Oak Tech. Sec. Litig., No. 96-20552 SW, 1997 WL 448168, at * 1 (N.D. Cal. July
1, 1997) (upholding Marksman by applying the standard of the Second Circuit).
61. See Coffee, supra note 59, at 5 (discussing the Silicon Graphics court's holding relying upon
its view that Congress intended to adapt a stricter rule than that of the Second Circuit).
62. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1997). The Zeid court held that the
plaintiffs must allege specific facts showing the defendants' motive and opportunity to commit fraud
or "specific facts constituting circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior or recklessness." See id.
at 918. The Zeid court found that when the complaint is based on "investigation of counsel" rather than
"information and belief," the plaintiffs are not required to state with particularity all facts upon which
their beliefs are formed. See id. at 915. The court held, however, that plaintiffs must still meet the other
strict requirements of the Reform Act and rule 9(b) when the complaint is not based on information or
belief. See id. Specifically, the court held that the "[p]laintiffs cannot rely on conclusory allegations
or tenuous inferences but instead, must allege with particularity: (1) each statement, (2) why each
statement is false, and (3) as to each statement, facts giving rise to a strong inference that Defendants
acted with scienter." Id. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' 104 page complaint with prejudice because
the plaintiffs failed to plead each allegation with particularity. See id. at 925. Scholarly testimony
before the Congressional Committee on securities reform noted that Zeid's "all facts" pleading
requirement is a point of major uncertainty under the Reform Act. See Ten Things We Know, supra
note 18. Zeid is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. See id. The SEC filed an amicus curiae brief
in October 1997. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Zeid. (No.
97-16070) (last modified Dec. 3, 1997) <http:llsecurities.stanford.edulbriefs/firefox/9716070/sec.html>.
63. See Silicon Graphics II, 970 F. Supp. at 766.
64. See Edward Brodsky, Scienter Under the 1995 Reform Act, N.Y.L.J., July 9, 1997, at 3.
65. See id.
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circuit that has been faced with this issue has found recklessness to be sufficient.66
Undoubtedly, Silicon Graphics court finds ample support for its decisions in the
Reform Act's language, legislative history, and public policy goals.67 The well-
reasoned Silicon Graphics cases are evidence that a uniform pleading standard does
not exist, and consequently, the federal district courts are deciphering the language
of the statute for themselves.
Silicon Graphics I was decided on September 25, 1996.68 The district court
held that the plaintiffs "must allege specific facts that constitute circumstantial
evidence of conscious behavior by defendants. '69 After a brief analysis of the
Reform Act's legislative history, the court further found that Congress did not
intend to codify the Second Circuit's standard for pleading scienter in its entirety,
as evidenced in the Conference Committee Report accompanying the Reform Act. "
The court asserted that "[b]ecause Congress chose not to include that language
from the Second Circuit standard relating to motive, opportunity, and recklessness,
Congress must have adopted the Conference Committee view and intended that a
narrower first prong apply."'" Thus, the court dismissed Silicon Graphics I with
leave to amend.72
Silicon Graphics II, decided on May 23, 1997, reiterates and expands on the
holding in Silicon Graphics L73 The Silicon Graphics II court specified that
"deliberate recklessness" is the scienter requirement which constitutes "a strong
inference of knowing or intentional misconduct."74 The deliberate recklessness
standard favored by Judge Smith was described in Hollinger v. Titan Capital
66. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 59, at 5. This ruling has been described as "terrible" because it will
be too difficult for victims of securities fraud to satisfy a deliberate recklessness standard. See Bruce
Rubenstein, Fraud Failsafe or License to Lie: Big Decisions on Securities Reform Act Coming; State
and Federal Courts to Rule, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1997, at 1 (analyzing recent court decisions).
67. See Brodsky, supra note 64, at 3.
68. See Silicon Graphics I, No. 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
69. See id. at *6.
70. See id. at *5-*6. As further evidence of the intent to heighten the pleading standard, the court
referenced a Senate bill under consideration. See id. at *5. The Senate bill codified the standard of the
Second Circuit; however, the Conference Committee rejected this version of the bill. See id. The court
also found support for its analysis in President Clinton's veto of the bill and his accompanying
explanation that Congress had "made crystal clear ... their intent to raise the standard." See id. See
also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
71. Silicon Graphics 1, 1996 WL 664639, at *6. Therefore, facts constituting circumstantial
evidence of conscious behavior by defendants must be pleaded. See id.
72. See id. at *16; see also Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031, 1039 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (agreeing
with Judge Smith's reasoning in Silicon Graphics I invoking a stricter pleading standard for scienter).
73. Silicon Graphics II, 970 F. Supp. 746, 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
74. See id. at 757. Some commentators speculate that Judge Smith's clarification is an attempt to
protect the court's decision on appeal, while others believe this clarification is a natural progression
from the judge's well-reasoned opinion. See Brodsky, supra note 64, at 3.
388
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Corp.,75 but "[u]nfortunately is neither universally accepted, nor universally
applied."76 Deliberate recklessness is defined as "a highly unreasonable omission,
involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or so obvious that
the actor must have been aware of it."77
The Silicon Graphics II court noted that even within the Second Circuit, case
law is conflicting as to what constitutes scienter for purposes of section 10(b).78
The court analyzed three lines of Second Circuit authority that have addressed the
scienter requirement.79 The three distinct approaches illustrated to the court that
a uniform standard did not exist within the Second Circuit, thereby bolstering the
court's theory as to why Congress did not codify the Second Circuit's law."0
Specifically, the court found that the Second Circuit's lack of uniformity was
contradictory to the Reform Act's legislative intent to establish "uniform and more
stringent pleading requirements to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits."'" The
court recognized that the legislative history of the Reform Act had not been entirely
consistent because the legislators themselves were unable to agree upon the
contours of the Second Circuit's standard. 2 However, the court found that the
75. 914 F.2d 1564, 1568 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that recklessness, las defined by the court, may
satisfy the scienter requirement for damages under a section 10(b) claim and rule 10b-5). The deliberate
recklessness standard was also alluded to in Hochfelder. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 197 (1976); Silicon Graphics 11, 970 F. Supp. at 757.
76. See Silicon Graphics I1, 970 F. Supp. at 755. This definition of recklessness appears
compatible with Supreme Court cases. See id.
77. See id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1569); see also Brodsky, supra note
64, at 3.
78. See Silicon Graphics 11, 970 F. Supp. at 755.
79. See id. The Silicon Graphics 11 court cited numerous cases in their analysis. See id. First, the
court cited Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), which pennitted
"unqualified allegations of recklessness" to establish scienter. See Silicon Graphics II, 970 F. Supp.
at 755 (citing Lanza, 479 F.2d at 1306). Second, the court cited Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), amended by 1978 WL 4098 (2d Cir. May 22, 1978), which permitted
"recklessness to establish scienter only if the defendant also had a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff."
Silicon Graphics 11, 970 F. Supp. at 755 (citing Rolf, 570 F.2d at 44). Last, the court cited Weschler
v. Steinberg 733 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1984), which was the strictest approach, requiring "actual intent
or circumstances implying actual intent before finding scienter." See Silicon Graphics 11, 970 F. Supp.
at 755 (citing Weschler, 733 F.2d at 1058).
80. See Silicon Graphics II, 970 F. Supp. at 755-57.
81. See id. at 755-56 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 736). Furthermore, because language referring to motive, opportunity and recklessness
was left out of the Reform Act, the court asserted that Congress appears to favor the Weschler approach
as opposed to the Lanza and Rolf lines of authority. See id.
82. See id. at 756-57. Again, the court placed emphasis on President Clinton's veto. See id. at 756;
see also supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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Conference Committee Report and the final text of the Reform Act adopted
contained the most persuasive evidence of legislative intent.83 Consequently, the
court disagreed with claims stating that mere recklessness is still an applicable
standard under the Reform Act because the recklessness language, along with
motive and opportunity, had been precisely omitted from the Reform Act. 8 In sum,
under Silicon Graphics II, "[m]otive, opportunity, and non-deliberate recklessness
may provide some evidence of intentional wrongdoing, but are not alone sufficient
to support scienter unless the totality of the evidence creates a strong inference of
fraud."85
Taking the heightened pleading standard into consideration, the court in
Silicon Graphics H held that the plaintiffs' amended complaint was too generic.86
In order to provide sufficiently detailed information about the alleged negative
internal reports, the plaintiffs' allegations "should include the titles of the reports,
when they were prepared, who prepared them, to whom they were directed, their
content, and the sources from which plaintiffs obtained this information."87 The
court stated that the extent of disclosure required from the plaintiffs conformed to
the Reform Act's pleading requirements."5 The court supported its decision by
finding that the plaintiffs' amended allegations did not even meet the requirements
set forth under the Second Circuit's standard of providing names and dates, much
less the new, stricter pleading standard favored by the Reform Act.89 While the
plaintiffs also made an in camera submission to the court, the court declined to
review this material.' The court, however, noted the possibility that this
submission may have contained sources or specific facts as required by the Reform
Act that would improve the plaintiffs' allegations of fraud.9 Subsequently, the
court allowed plaintiffs an opportunity to supplement their pleadings.92
83. See Silicon Graphics 11,'970 F. Supp. at 757.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 767.
87. Id. The extent of disclosure was the subject of Congressional debate. See id. at 763.
Representative Bryant was concerned by the extent of specificity a heightened pleading standard
imposes on plaintiffs from the outset of their claim. See id. Moreover, Representative Dingell voiced
concerns that the heightened pleading standard requires the disclosure of the names of confidential
informants, employees, competitors, and others who provide information leading to the filing of the
case. See id. Nevertheless, the court found that the Reform Act imposes the strict standards with which
both representatives were concerned. See id. The strict pleading standard forces plaintiffs to allege all
improprieties they are charging up front, but it does not require plaintiffs to immediately prove these
allegations. See Rubenstein, supra note 66, at 1. The strict pleading standard effectively avoids a
"fishing expedition," a lawsuit which occurs when "somebody does not know what they are after at
first." See id. at I (quoting Rep. Christopher Cox, R-Cal.).
88. See Silicon Graphics 1I, 970 F. Supp. at 767.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 768.
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The plaintiffs declined Judge Smith's invitation to amend the pleadings and
instead referred the court to the in camera submission previously made.93 Although
the plaintiffs' in camera submission may have contained specific sources or facts
that the court requested, the court declined to review the resubmission.94 The court
firmly held its prior position, stating that the information requested from the
plaintiffs, which required specific allegations of securities fraud, was not privileged
material as the plaintiffs had contended.95 The court dismissed the resubmission
with prejudice, 96 and the case is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 97
Before the Silicon Graphics II trial court rendered its decision, the SEC filed
an amicus curiae brief in February 1997.98 In the brief, the Commission urged the
district court to reconsider its earlier decision in Silicon Graphics I, which found
that mere recklessness was insufficient for liability under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and under rule lOb-5. 99 The Commission asserted that the Reform
Act does not change the definition of the state of mind required in a private
securities fraud action."° Instead, the SEC asserted that Congress "only sought to
strengthen pleading standards, not to change the substantive standard for
scienter.". The Commission alleged that "[i]n determining that section 21 D(b)(2)
required the pleading of conscious behavior, the Court drew from a purely
procedural provision the incorrect conclusion that Congress had eliminated a well
93. See Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Utig., No. C 96-0393 FMS, 1997 WL 337580, at * 1 (N.D. Cal.
June 5, 1997).
94. See id.
95. See id. The court stated that "[pilaintiffs have cited no authority, and the Court is aware of none,
that allows a party to base its pleadings on secret information to which the opposition is denied access
and an opportunity to respond." Id.
96. See id.
97. See Ninth Circuit to Decide How Much Detail is Required by Reform Act: In re Silicon
Graphics Securities Litigation, ANDREWS SEC. & COMMODITIES LriTG. REP., July 9, 1997, at 12. The
SEC filed an amicus curiae brief with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals asking the court to reconsider
the district court's decision. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae,
Silicon Graphics 11 (No. 97-16240) (last modified Dec. 1, 1997)
<http://securities.stanford.edu/briefs/sgi/9716240/sec.htm 1>.
98. See Commission Files Amicus Brief in Silicon Graphics Litigation, S.E.C. NEWS RELEASE, Feb.
4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 41379 [hereinafter Commission Files Amicus Brief].
99. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Concerning Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 9, Silicon Graphics 11 (No. C 96-0393 FMS) [hereinafter
Amicus Curiae, February 1997]. But see Brief of the American Electronics Association, Amicus
Curiae, Regarding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, Silicon Graphics 11 (No.
C 96-0393 FMS) (supporting Judge Smith's interpretation of the Reform Act by stating that this was
exactly what Congress had in mind).
100. See Amicus Curiae, February 1997, supra note 99, at 9.
101. See id. at 8.
established substantive standard."' 2  The Commission contended that it has
consistently supported a recklessness standard for pleading fraud, that a reckless-
ness standard prevents defendants from escaping liability' in comparison to
knowledge or conscious intent standards which are more difficult to prove, and that
any retreat from the recklessness standard will erode the deterrent effect of section
10(b) actions.' 3 Furthermore, a recklessness standard is "needed to protect
investors and the securities markets from fraudulent conduct and to protect the
integrity of the disclosure process."'"' The Commission urged that a "higher
scienter standard would lessen the incentives for corporations to conduct a full
inquiry into potentially troublesome or embarrassing areas, and thus would threaten
the process that has made our markets a model for nations around the world."'1
0 5
If the Commission is correct, then one must ask why Congress did not codify
the Second Circuit's standard for pleading fraud. Richard H. Walker, the General
Counsel for the SEC, attempted to address this question when he stated, "[wihile
Congress certainly sought to strengthen the pleading requirements in private
securities fraud actions, it clearly did not intend to eliminate liability for reckless
behavior. The recklessness standard requires a high level of culpability and has
long been recognized by the courts as sufficient for a finding of fraud."'0 6
However, Mr. Walker's statement is contrary to general sentiments expressed in
the Conference Committee Report accompanying the Reform Act.0 7 The
Conference Committee specifically noted testimony from both House and Senate
hearings expressing "the need to establish uniform and more stringent pleading
requirements to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits."'0 8  The Conference
Committee further noted that even though the plaintiffs are required to plead fraud
under rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with particularity, this
standard has not deterred meritless lawsuits as securities laws are still abused by
private litigants."
102. Id. at 3. The Commission believed that the district court erroneously relied on footnote 23 of
the Conference Committee Report and the report's omission of language referring to "motive,
opportunity, or recklessness" to support its position that only a conscious behavior standard met the
strong inference test. See id. at 11-13. The Commission asserted that footnote 23 "merely explains the
result of the Conference Committee's decision not to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting
the pleading standard." See id. at 12. Instead, the Commission opined that Congress preferred to allow
the courts to use their discretion "to create their own standards for determining whether a plaintiff has
established the required strong inference." See id. at 13. Thus, the Commission further stated that
recklessness is a sufficient standard so long as the "plaintiffs can state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that defendants acted" with the required state of mind. See id.
103. See id. at 3.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. Commission Files Amicus Brief, supra note 98, at *1.
107. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 36 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 736.
108. See id. at 41.
109. See id. at 26-27. Abuses include: (1) the routine filing of lawsuits whenever there is a
significant decline in the issuer's stock price without regard to culpability and "with only faint hope"
that discovery will lead to "some plausible cause of action;" (2) targeting "deep pocket defendants"
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B. The First Circuit
In Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc.," ° a First Circuit district court discussed
the proper pleading standard under the Reform Act."' In order to satisfy the
Reform Act's "strong inference of scienter" requirement, the court held that "the
plaintiff must set forth specific facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence
of conscious behavior by defendants.""' 2 According to the Friedberg court,
"reasonable belief' was the appropriate pre-Reform Act pleading standard in the
First Circuit."3 The court asserted that the Reform Act then raised the pleading
standard to a strong inference of scienter, but failed to give the court guidance as
to what constitutes a strong inference.' Consequently, the court was forced to rely
upon the Reform Act's legislative history."5
The Friedberg court noted that at the time of the Reform Act's passage, the
Second Circuit's pleading standard already existed. "' However, the court
concluded that the Reform Act essentially discarded that standard because of the
Conference Committee's intent to strengthen the existing pleading requirements. "'
The court reasoned that because of this goal, the Conference Committee "purposely
chose not to include in its pleading standard language derived from Second Circuit
case law relating to motive, opportunity or recklessness.""' Instead, the court
supported the Second Circuit's conscious behavior standard because the circum-
stantial allegations a plaintiff must plead to constitute conscious behavior are
greater and stronger than those needed to show motive and opportunity.' The
court had a difficult time differentiating between reckless behavior and conscious
behavior as they are commonly placed in the same category, but the court reasoned
without regard to culpability; (3) imposing burdensome and costly discovery processes which force
defendants to settle; and (4) "manipulation" by class action lawyers of plaintiffs they purport to
represent. See id. These abuses are rarely mitigated because judges are reluctant to impose any
sanctions under rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at *27. These abuses also
adversely affect investors and the economy because the highly qualified individuals are reluctant to
become involved in securities-related positions as they fear frivolous and costly lawsuits. See id.
110. 959 F. Supp. 42 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1997).
111. See id. at 48.
112. See id. at 49-50.
113. See id. at 48 (citing Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 92 F.3d 1194, 1223-24 (1st Cir. 1996)).
114. See id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995)).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. As evidence of the intent to heighten the pleading standard, the court referenced
footnote 23 of the Conference Committee Report. See id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41).
118. Seeid.
119. See id. at 49.
that conscious behavior is the more stringent standard because "circumstantial
evidence indicating intent to defraud or knowledge of the falsity" must be
pleaded.12 ° The court's rationale was supported by the Reform Act's elimination
of language referring to recklessness from the pleading standard.
121
C. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit provides the second most active forum for securities
lawsuits.'22 Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc. '23 was among the first cases
in the Second Circuit to engage in the long discussion regarding the pleading
standard under the Reform Act. 24 The Norwood court asserted that the Reform
Act imposes a higher pleading standard than that of the Second Circuit by holding
that a plaintiff must plead conscious misrepresentations or omissions.125 Judge
Baer noted that the Conference Committee Report accompanying the Reform Act
reflected Congress's choice not to include certain language from the second prong
of the Second Circuit's standard relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness in
the pleading standard.'26 However, the court found it "instructive to look at the
first prong of the Second Circuit's standard" to decipher what satisfies the post-
Reform Act pleading standard. 127 Because the Conference Committee Report
failed to expressly reject the applicability of the Second Circuit's conscious
behavior pleading standard, the court decided to apply that standard under the
Reform Act. 128 While Norwood did not specifically address whether recklessness
survives as a valid pleading standard, the court essentially dismissed its applicabil-
ity through an explanation of what constitutes conscious behavior. '29 From that
discussion, it is apparent that mere recklessness does not satisfy the knowing
misrepresentation standard supported by the court. 3 '
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 49, and text accompanying table 12. Between December
22, 1995 and December 31, 1996, 18.1% of all securities class actions were filed in the New York
district courts. See id.
123. 959 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
124. See id. at 208.
125. See id.
126. See id. Judge Baer cited to footnote 23 of the Conference Committee Report to explain the
intent behind the omission of this language. See id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41
(1995)).
127. See id.
128. See id. The court stated that factual statements coupled with "conclusory allegations of
fraudulent intent" do not satisfy the pleading standard for scienter. See id.
129. See id. at 208-09.
130. See id. The court noted that allegations of "a prosperous future compared to a bleaker reality"
do not rise to the level of "knowing misrepresentation." See id.
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However, in In re Baesa Securities Litigation,"'3 the court utilized a plain
language approach to the Reform Act to determine whether a heightened pleading
standard exists. 3 2 The Baesa court differed from the Norwood court by holding
that the Reform Act did not heighten the substantive law scienter requirement in
private securities fraud actions by requiring more than recklessness. 133 However,
the court found that the Reform Act no longer permits under procedural law the
mere pleading of motive and opportunity alone to automatically establish a strong
inference of scienter"3" Because the Reform Act fails to address what is
specifically needed to satisfy the substantive requirement of scienter, the Baesa
court looked to the Exchange Act itself and to existing case law for guidance. '35
The court recognized and accepted precedent holding that recklessness suffices as
an adequate state of mind to find securities fraud.'36 The court reasoned that
because the Reform Act does not explicitly refute recklessness as a substantive law
standard, it remains a viable form of scienter in private securities fraud litigation. '37
While the substantive law for the required state of mind in securities fraud remains
constant, the Baesa court found that the Reform Act does heighten the pleading
standard.'38 The court reasoned that because the Reform Act does not mention
motive and opportunity, the plain language of the statute dictates that motive and
opportunity alone do not automatically suffice to raise a strong inference of
scienter.'39
The Baesa holding received favorable reaction, causing one commentator to
state the following:
[Tihe Baesa ruling is much more favorable to securities-suit plaintiffs than the
Silicon Graphics ruling was. But, because it toughens the motive-and-opportunity
131. 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
132. See id. at 241.
133. See id. at 239.
134. See id. at 242.
135. See id. at 240.
136. See id. at 241. Typically, recklessness in securities fraud cases embraces "some form of
conscious disregard." See id. This is because "'[r]eckless conduct is, at the least, conduct which is
highly unreasonable and which represents an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care.
. to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must
have been aware of it."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Chill v. General Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263,
269 (2d Cir. 1996)).
137.- See id. at 241. The Baesa court stated that cases suggesting otherwise had "substituted a
selective reading of the convoluted legislative history for the clear and unambiguous language of the
statute. When the statutory text is so plain, resort to legislative history is neither necessary nor prudent."
See id.
138. See id. at 242.
139. See id.
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standard, it doesn't simply endorse the previous status quo ....
.. "It's a somewhat new stance on what must be shown" to establish that a
defendant had the requisite mental state to be liable for securities fraud. 40
The SEC was particularly delighted with the Baesa holding and was in full
agreement that recklessness remains a viable post-Reform Act substantive law
standard.' 4
Another recent district court case in the Second Circuit is In re Glenayre
Technologies, Inc. Securities Litigation.'42 In Glenayre, Judge Baer clarified and
reaffirmed the court's decision in Norwood, by applying the Norwood holding to
Glenayre'43 Judge Baer specified that "'motive and opportunity' alone will no
longer suffice to meet the required pleading standard" under the Reform Act. '44
The court quickly clarified that the Reform Act did not change the substantive law
but only changed the pleading standard that must be met to raise a strong inference
of scienter' 45 Thus, recklessness meets the scienter requirement as long as it is
conscious recklessness.'46 Furthermore, Judge Baer asserted that this more
stringent pleading standard has become the new law for the Southern District of
New York. 14
Not all district courts in New York, however, have departed from the
traditional Second Circuit standard for pleading securities fraud. For example, the
court in Sloane Overseas Fund, Ltd. v. Sapiens International Corp.41 summarized
the Reform Act as codifying the Second Circuit's standard for pleading fraud. 149
More recently, the court in Shahzad v. H.J. Meyers & Co.'50 also adopted the
Second Circuit's standard for pleading fraud. 5' Similarly, the court in In re
140. Michael Rapoport, Baesa Ruling Strikes Middle Ground on Secur-Suit Standard, Dow JONES
NEWS SERV., July 9, 1997, available in WESTLAW DJNSPLUS database (quoting John Coffee, law
professor and securities expert at Columbia University).
141. See id.
142. 982 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
143. See id. at 298.
144. See id. However, this approach does not completely disregard facts showing motive and
opportunity. See id. Such facts can be taken into account when determining if "a complaint raises a
strong inference of knowing misrepresentation." See id.
145. See id. Judge Baer asserted that Baesa's plain language interpretation of the Reform Act
renders this same view. See id.
146. See id. Judge Baer stated, "I emphasize, however, that recklessness in this context approximates
actual intent, and is not merely a heightened form of negligence." Id.
147. See id.; see also In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Norwood
Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205, 208-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
148. 941 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
149. See id. at 1377.
150. No. 95 Civ. 6196 (DAB), 1997 WL47817, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1997).
151. See id. at *7 n.6. The court further stated that it was applying the standard for pleading fraud
as articulated in San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75
F.3d 801 (2nd Cir. 1996). See Shahzad, 1997 WL 47817, at *7 n.6. However, San Leandro was argued
September 12, 1995, before the Reform Act was applicable. See San Leandro, 75 F.3d at 801.
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Wellcare Management Group, Inc. Securities Litigation15 2 applied both the motive
and opportunity and conscious or reckless behavior tests to determine whether the
complaint sufficiently pleaded scienter' 53 Moreover, the court in Pilarczyk v.
Morrison Knudsen Corp.'54 followed the Second Circuit standard for pleading
securities fraud and asserted that the Reform Act merely adopts the stringent
standards of the Second Circuit. 55
Another case, OnBank & Trust Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. ,156
followed the Second Circuit standard for pleading securities fraud.157 Chief Judge
Larimer refuted arguments that the pleading standard had been heightened as a
result of the assertions set forth in the Conference Committee Report, especially
with respect to footnote twenty-three.' Chief Judge Larimer stated that he was not
convinced that a "single, ambiguous statement" could invalidate established, pre-
Reform Act, Second Circuit case law which holds that motive, opportunity, and
recklessness adequately plead the scienter requirement in securities fraud
litigation.'59 Furthermore, Chief Judge Larimer opined that Congress's failure to
explicitly codify Second Circuit case law by specifying this language in the Reform
Act was not evidence of Congress's intent to overturn established law. 60 Chief
Judge Larimer further concluded that "[a]s long as the court applies the statute as
written, allegations of motive, opportunity, or reckless behavior may still be
relevant."''
The In re Health Management, Inc. Securities Litigation '62 opinion recognized
that the two Second Circuit cases which have conducted extensive analytical
evaluation of the Reform Act, Norwood and Baesa, hold !inapposite views which
are either derived by a thorough examination of the Reform Act's legislative
history or by undertaking a strict, plain reading of the statute. '63 However, the
Health Management court was not completely swayed by either opinion and held
that both recklessness as well as motive and opportunity are sufficient to plead a
152. 964 F. Supp. 632 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
153. See id. at 638-40.
154. 965 F. Supp. 311 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
155. See id. at 320.
156. 967 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
157. See id. at 88.
158. See id. at 88 n.4.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. 970 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
163. Seeid. at201.
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strong inference of scienter under the Reform Act. 6 The court reasoned that the
motive and opportunity test is not abrogated under the Reform Act because if the
standard under the Reform Act was to be one of knowing misbehavior, Congress
would not have omitted communicating this intent in the statute. 165 Instead, the
court reasoned that because Congress decided to omit such specific language, the
Second Circuit standard remains viable. 6 The court further asserted that Congress
intended the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether plaintiffs have
satisfied the pleading standard. 167  Thus, by upholding the Second Circuit's
standard, the court could take into consideration motive and opportunity, conscious
misbehavior, recklessness, or other novel legal theories impressed upon the
court. 168
D. The Third Circuit
Traditionally, in order to plead scienter, the Third Circuit has required
plaintiffs "to allege facts demonstrating that a defendant 'lacked a genuine belief
that the information disclosed was accurate and complete in all material
respects."" 69 Thus, plaintiffs could plead circumstantial evidence or recklessness
to meet the requirement for scienter."7 ° Post-Reform Act, federal district courts in
the Third Circuit are slowly beginning to take into consideration the possibility of
a heightened pleading standard.
Voit v. Wonderware Corp. is a Third Circuit case which was particularly
influenced by both the Norwood and Friedberg courts' interpretations of the
Reform Act.'7 ' Likewise, the Voit court analyzed the Reform Act's legislative
history and held that Congress intended a more stringent pleading standard than
that articulated by the Second Circuit.'72 The Voit court specifically adopted the
Friedberg court's conscious behavior pleading standard and also found this
approach to be consistent with the Norwood court's knowing misrepresentation
standard. '73 Applying the Second Circuit's standard, the Voit court found that "the
'conscious behavior' standard is more difficult to pass than the 'motive and
opportunity' or 'recklessness' standards."' 74 Consequently, to meet the conscious
164. See id. The Health Management court found the Baesa holding persuasive to the extent it
upholds recklessness as a form of scienter, but disagreed with the Baesa court's assertion that the
pleading of motive and opportunity does not adequately allege scienter. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (quoting In re Phillips
Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989)).
170. See id.
171. See id. at 374.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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behavior approach, plaintiffs must "allege facts which give rise to a strong
inference or constitute strong circumstantial evidence of either knowing or
conscious behavior."'
75
Berkowitz v. Conrail, Inc.'76 was decided approximately three weeks after
Voit. 17 The Berkowitz court noted recent federal district court activity either
refuting or supporting a heightened pleading standard, but failed to reach a
conclusion.178 However, the court believed that at a minimum the Reform Act
codified the Second Circuit's pleading standard. 7 9
E. The Fifth Circuit
Pre-Reform Act, the Fifth Circuit held that fraudulent intent could be found
where motive to commit fraud was presented.' Post-Reform Act, decisions made
by federal district courts in the Fifth Circuit have not strayed from the Second
Circuit's approach to pleading securities fraud."8' The decision in STI Classic
Fund v. Bollinger Industries, Inc., which implicitly upheld the Second Circuit's
standard, was first recommended by a magistrate,'82 and then affirmed by the chief
district judge.8 3 The STI Classic Fund I court was particularly influenced by the
Marksman court and also concluded that the motive and opportunity test was still
applicable. l Like the Marksman court, the STI Classic Fund I court believed that
had Congress disapproved of the motive and opportunity test, then Congress would
have explicitly stated its disapproval in the Reform Act. 5
175. See id.
176. No. CIV.A.97-1214, 1997 WL 611606, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 1997).
177. See id. at *1.
178. See id. at*15.
179. See id.
180. See STI Classic Fund v. Bollinger Indus., Inc., No. CA 3:96-CV-0823-R, 1996 WL 885802, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 1996) [hereinafter STI Classic Fund I].
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See STI Classic Fund v. Bollinger Indus., Inc., No. CA 3: 96-CV-0823-R, 1996 WL 866699,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1996).
184. See STI Classic Fund 1, 1996 WL 885802, at *1.
185. See id. Williams v. WMX Technologies, Inc., 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997), also upheld the
Second Circuit's standard, but Williams was filed prior to the effective date of the Reform Act. See id.
at 178.
F. The Sixth Circuit
The court in Havenick v. Network Express, Inc.1"6 interpreted the Reform Act
as expanding rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.187 The court
analyzed the language of the Reform Act and its legislative history and stated that
the appropriate pleading standard for securities fraud was met by combining the
Reform Act and the traditionally accepted application of the Sixth Circuit's Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) jurisprudence.'88 Through this interpretation, the
Havenick court endorsed a heightened pleading standard which eliminated the
Second Circuit's recklessness and motive and opportunity tests for pleading
scienter.
G. The Seventh Circuit
Rehm v. Eagle Finance Corp."o was the first case in the Seventh Circuit to
discuss the pleading standard for fraud."'9 The court held that "[diespite conflicting
judicial views on this issue, and ambivalent language in the legislative history, we
agree with plaintiff that [the Reform Act] does not impose a more rigorous pleading
requirement than that enunciated by the Second Circuit."'92 The court specifically
found that the Reform Act "adopts the Second Circuit standard," but that the
186. 981 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
187. See id. at 524. The court recognized the language in footnote 23 of the Conference Committee
Report as proof of the Committee's intent to heighten the pleading standard. See id.
188. See id. The court stated that the plaintiffs' complaint should specify:
(1) the parties and the participants to the alleged fraud; (2) the time, place and content of the
representations; (3) each statement alleged to have been misleading; (4) the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading; (5) if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is
made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed; (6) the fraudulent scheme; (7) the fraudulent intent of the defendants; (8)
reliance on the fraud; and (9) the injury resulting from the fraud.
Id. Note that language referring to motive, opportunity, or recklessness is not mentioned. See id.
Havenick was not the first case in the Sixth Circuit to decide that the pleading standard was heightened
under the Reform Act. See Securities Litigation Abuses: Concerning S. 1260, the "Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997," Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman,
SEC) (discussing In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17262 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18,
1997)), available in 1997 WL 14152726. Currently, Hoffman v. Comshare, Inc., is on appeal to the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae,
Comshare, (No. 97-2098) (last modified Jan. 9, 1998)
<http://securities.stanford.edu/briefs/comshare/9702098/sec.html> The district court in Hoffman found
that the Reform Act required plaintiffs to plead specific facts creating a strong inference of knowing
misrepresentations on behalf of the defendants. See id.
189. See Havenick, 981 F. Supp. at 524.
190. 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. 111. 1997).
191. See id. at 1252.
192. Id. (citations omitted).
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Reform Act "declines to bind courts" to this standard.193 The court stated that the
three factors pertaining to the Reform Act's language, history, and purpose justify
its conclusion.194 First, the strong inference language used in the Reform Act
"mirrors the language traditionally employed by the Second Circuit in its
application of rule 9(b) to scienter pleadings."'95 The court inferred that the
verbatim use of the language strongly indicates an intent to enact the same pleading
standard for the Reform Act.196 Second, the court found that "the legislative
history supports a reading of the [Reform Act] consistent with this view."'9 7 Third,
the court believed that adopting the Second Circuit's standard, it best reconciled
"conflicting policy concerns underlying the [Reform Act].' 98 The court further
expressed that by "[r]atchetting up the standard to conform with the stringent
Second Circuit test satisfies Congress' goal of curtailing abusive securities
litigation while still leaving room for aggrieved parties to bring valid securities
fraud claims."'99 Furthermore, "[t]o impose a higher pleading standard would make
it extremely difficult to sufficiently plead a 1 Ob-5 claim-an outcome which would
certainly be contrary to the broad remedial purposes of the federal securities
laws. ,, "0
Approximately two months later, Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc.20 was decided.
The holding in Fugman followed Rehm.2 °2 Without entering into a long analytical
discussion, the court found guidance in and accepted the Rehm court's decision
adopting the Second Circuit's standard.2 3 The Fugman court was particularly
persuaded by Judge Moran's well-reasoned opinion based upon the legislative
history of the Reform Act.2' 4 Similarly, Gilford Partners, L.P. v. Sensormatic
Electronics Corp.,205 the most recent case decided in the Seventh Circuit, followed
Rehm.2"6 The Gilford court stated that scienter could be pleaded by motive and
opportunity or facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. Id. (citations omitted).
200. Id.
201. 961 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
202. See id. at 1195; see also Galaxy Inv. Fund, Ltd. v. Fenchurch Capital Management, Ltd., No.
96 C 8098, 1007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13207, at *36-*37 (N.D. UIl. Aug. 29, 1997) (holding that the
Second Circuit's standard has been codified under the Reform Act).
203. See Fugman, 961 F. Supp. at 1195.
204. See id.
205. No. 96 C 4072, 1997 WL 757495, at *1 (N.D. I1. Nov. 24, 1997).
206. See id. at * 18.
misbehavior or recklessness.2 "
H. The Eleventh Circuit
Two Eleventh Circuit cases have touched upon the pleading standard for
securities fraud after the Reform Act, but neither case engaged in any meaningful
analytical discussion. Fischler v. Amsouth Bancorporation2 °. adopted the Second
Circuit's standard for pleading securities fraud.2" Page v. Derrickson,21 ° which
follows Fischler, also adopted both prongs of the Second Circuit standard as means
of establishing a strong inference.2"
Two other Eleventh Circuit cases, Gross v. Medaphis Corp.2 12 and In re
ValuJet, Inc, 213 have failed to establish the appropriate pleading standard for
securities fraud under the Reform Act.214 The Gross court did not find a need to
resolve this issue because the plaintiffs in the case were able to meet both prongs
articulated in the Second Circuit's standard.2 5 In a footnote, the Gross court noted
that a majority of the courts have agreed with Rehm and that the "[c]ourts have
given deference to the views of the SEC in matters relating to the interpretation and
enforcement of the federal securities laws." '216 The ValuJet court also held that it
was not necessary to conclude whether the plaintiffs met the appropriate post-
Reform Act pleading standard for securities fraud because the facts pleaded by the
plaintiffs met both tests articulated under the Second Circuit's standard.2"7
IV. CONCLUSION
The longterm legal implications of the decisions reached thus far by courts
considering the pleading standard under the Reform Act are difficult to predict,
because recent decisions have only been made at the district court level and will not
reach the appellate court level for some time.2 Nevertheless, if courts tend to
207. See id.
208. 971 F. Supp. 533 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
209. See id. at 535.
210. No. 96-842-CIV-T-17C, 1997 WL 148558 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 1997).
211. Seeid. at*9.
212. 977 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
213. 984 F. Supp. 1472 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
214. See Gross, 977 F. Supp. at 1472; ValuJet, 984 F. Supp. at 1478.
215. See Gross, 977 F. Supp. at 1472.
216. See id. at 1471 n.4.
217. See ValuJet, 984 F. Supp. at 1480.
218. See Ten Things We Know, supra note 18. It is predicted that "[wie will be well into 1998 before
... any Court of Appeals interprets the pleading standard, into 1999, before we know whether [there
is] consensus or disagreement among the twelve Courts of Appeal" as to the proper pleading standard.
See Securities Litigation: Implementation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th
Cong. (1997) (testimony of Leonard B. Simon, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, LLP),
available in 1997 WL 14152316. If a "Circuit split" emerges among the 12 Courts of Appeals, it is
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follow a more stringent pleading standard as favored in the Silicon Graphics cases,
it is likely that defendants will prevail more often on motions to dismiss and that
there will be a decline in the number of federal complaints filed.2" 9Post-Reform Act studies conducted by both the SEC and independent
organizations measure the short-term impact on the number of suits filed in federal
courts.22° In the first year following the enactment of the Reform Act, the SEC
identified 105 securities cases filed in federal court. 2 ' Securities Class Action
Alert identified this figure as representing a decline from the 153 suits filed in
1993, the 221 suits filed in 1994, and the 158 suits in 1995.222 A more recent study
indicates that the number of suits filed is currently rebounding to, and well within
the range of, pre-Reform Act statistics.223
Since the enactment of the Reform Act, there also seems to be an apparent
migration of securities fraud cases to state courts.224 The large increase in the
number of state court cases filed is best described as a "substitution effect,"
whereby plaintiffs elect to file suit in state courts to either avoid the federal
pleading standard, safe harbor provisions, discovery stays, or notice
requirements.225 In many state courts, plaintiffs do not need a unanimous verdict
as they would in the federal system, and thus, plaintiffs can recover on a 9-3 jury
vote.2 26 In addition to procedural advantages, plaintiffs can also recover on a
showing of negligence, as opposed to recklessness or intentional misconduct.227
However, fluctuations in the number of state or federal court cases filed are not
very likely that the Supreme Court will "take up this issue." See id.
219. See Ten Things We Know, supra note 18.
220. See, e.g., U.S. SEC, Office of the General Counsel, Report to the President and the Congress
on the First Year of Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, in SAILING IN "SAFE
HARBORS": DRAFrING FORWARD-LOOKING DiscLosUREs, at 90-91 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 80-0013, 1997) (listing the results from studies conducted by the SEC, Securities
Class Action Alert, and the National Economic Research Associates) [hereinafter Report to the
President].
221. See id.
222. See id. The decline in the number of suits filed in 1996 can be attributed to the large number
of class actions promptly filed in December 1995 to evade key Reform Act provisions. See Coffee, Jr.,
supra note 59, at 5.
223. See What We Know and Don't Know About the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce 105th
Cong. (1997) (testimony of Michael A. Perino, Stanford Law School) (last modified Oct. 23, 1997)
<http://securities.stanford.edu/report/testimony/971021 .html> [hereinafter What We Know and Don't
Know].
224. See Levitt, supra note 11. Recent figures indicate that there has been a 26% increase in state
court litigation. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 49.
225. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 49.
226. See Ten Things We Know, supra note 18.
227. See id.
necessarily indicative of the Reform Act's overall impact.228 More importantly, the
quality of suits filed has increased as pleadings are more specific and contain more
detailed factual allegations.229 This observation indicates that plaintiffs are taking
into account the possibility of a heightened, but unsettled, pleading standard.23 °
The different holdings rendered by federal district courts suggest that either
further legislation needs to be enacted, or a decision by a higher court is desper-
ately needed to determine what constitutes scienter for fraud. The need for further
clarification is apparent as the circuits struggle within themselves to determine the
adequate pleading standard. This need is especially evidenced in both the Ninth
and the Second Circuits as present decisions put into doubt past decisions.23' Thus
far, the other federal circuits to confront the pleading standard under the Reform
Act are consistently applying either the Second Circuit's standard or a more
stringent standard. The dominant and unquestioned trend in the Fifth, the Seventh
and the Eleventh Circuits embraces the standard set forth in the Second Circuit.232
The First and the Third Circuits currently favor the more stringent conscious
behavior approach as articulated in Friedberg.233 The Sixth Circuit also favors
imposing a heightened pleading standard..which either expands rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or requires a strong inference of knowing
misrepresentation.234
The courts heightening the pleading standard frequently reference the Reform
Act's omission of language referring to motive, opportunity, and recklessness to
support their position. Can courts correctly assume that because language relating
to motive, opportunity, and recklessness has been omitted from the pleading
standard, that these factors offer insufficient proof of scienter? This Comment has
illustrated how the federal district courts struggle to find meaning in this glaring
omission. Frequently, courts also refer to the Reform Act's legislative intent and
purpose to support their position and either conclude that the Reform Act did or did
not intend to abolish these factors under the Reform Act.235 The district courts'
holdings that the Reform Act intended to heighten the pleading standard for fraud
beyond the Second Circuit's standard offer well-founded arguments and
explanations, and consequently, higher courts reviewing these decisions will have
a difficult time refuting these interpretations. Thus, in the future it is very likely
that higher courts will impose a heightened standard. The real question, therefore,
becomes whether future courts are willing to support a higher pleading standard,
and if so, then just how much more stringent should this standard be?
228. See Report to the President, supra note 220, at 91.
229. See Levitt, supra note 10.
230. See id.
231. See supra notes 49-109, 122-68 and accompanying text discussing the Ninth and the Second
Circuits decisions.
232. See supra notes 180-85, 190-217 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 1 10-21., 169-79 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
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As noted in this Comment, the opinions in both Silicon Graphics cases are
very well-reasoned and illustrate the struggles the court embraces as it examines the
legislative history, purpose, and language of the Reform Act to conclude that a
more stringent pleading standard than the Second Circuit was intended.
23 6
Nevertheless, such thoughtful reasoning has not deterred criticism.237 First, if
Congress intended for a more stringent rule than motive and opportunity to apply,
there is no indication of how much more stringent the new requirement should be
or that conscious behavior should be substituted for proof of recklessness as the
new element to establish scienter.238 To counter such criticism, the Silicon
Graphics court can argue that its holdings are not intended to change the standard
for scienter, but instead only specify what must be pleaded in order to properly
allege scienter as dictated by the Reform Act.23 9 However, this is a "distinction
without a difference" because for plaintiffs to effectively plead facts showing
conscious behavior, plaintiffs abolish any liability for recklessness as they are
forced to plead specific facts and instances of conduct demonstrating fraud.?4
Second, even if conscious behavior was the accepted and required standard, this
standard is contrary to other provisions Congress provides in the statutes
.2
Specifically, this problem addresses the language under section 21(D)(g), the
proportionate liability provision of the Reform Act, which provides that the
standard of liability was not intended to be altered by the Reform Act and also
makes distinctions between knowing and non-knowing conduct.242 Questions arise
as to why this distinction is made if the real intent of the Reform Act, as pro-
nounced by the Silicon Graphics court, is to abolish recklessness as a standard of
liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 2  The Silicon Graphics court
addressed and refuted this issue by stating that the proportionate liability provisions
apply to the entire Exchange Act, and not simply to the Reform Act amendments.'
Regardless of the well-reasoned explanations given by the Silicon Graphics
court to support its position in both cases, the decisions have not received
widespread support. The Silicon Graphics cases will always be controversial not
because they heighten the pleadings standard, but mainly because they alter the
substantive law for the required state of mind to plead securities fraud by
236. See supra notes 63-97 and accompanying text.
237. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 59, at 5.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.; Silicon Graphics I, No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
abolishing motive, opportunity, and recklessness as forms of scienter. Conse-
quently, it is not likely that other courts will openly embrace the Silicon Graphics
approach because it departs too much from traditionally accepted standards and
often results in intervention by the SEC.
Instead, note that the SEC is much more receptive to a decision like Baesa
which raises the pleading standard for fraud while still maintaining that reckless-
ness remains a viable post-Reform Act form of scienter.245 The Baesa holding fits
in between the more extreme Silicon Graphics view and the various cases which
hold that the Second Circuit's standard is still applicable.246 The Baesa decision
is more accurately described as a hybrid of the Second Circuit standard and the
Reform Act's intent of establishing a more exact pleading standard. In a plain
language interpretation of the Reform Act, the Baesa court used the actual written
language of the Reform Act as a guideline for determining to what extent the
Reform Act heightens the pleading standard for securities fraud. 247 Unlike the
Silicon Graphics court, which placed a substantial value in the language found in
footnote twenty-three and the Congressional byplays that accompanied the Reform
Act, the Baesa court did not allow these factors to govern its decision.248 The
Baesa approach seems well-balanced because to allow otherwise would either give
too much weight to the language in footnote twenty-three and to Congressional
byplays which are too difficult to interpret, or completely disregard the Reform
Act's intent of imposing a heightened standard to curb the filing of frivolous
lawsuits.
Determining whether motive, opportunity, or recklessness no longer constitute
scienter for fraud will be a difficult undertaking for any of the higher courts faced
with this issue. Balancing the Reform Act's language, legislative history, and
purpose is not an easy task and frequently yields distinct views as evidenced in the
different opinions thus far reached by the federal district courts. However, in the
future, higher courts confronted with the issue should use the Baesa holding as a
guideline because Baesa' s plain language interpretation of the Reform Act imposes
natural limits on the lower courts while still championing the main goal of the
Reform Act: to curb the filing of frivolous lawsuits.
LISA A. HERRERA
245. See supra text accompanying note 140 (stating that Baesa is a more favorable decision for
plaintiffs).
246. See supra notes 142-68 and accompanying text.
247. See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
248. See id.
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